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Modeling and debiasing resource saving judgments
Ola Svenson∗† Nichel Gonzalez† Gabriella Eriksson† ‡
Abstract
Svenson (2011) showed that choices of one of two alternative productivity increases to save production resources (e.g.,
man-months) were biased. Judgments of resource savings following a speed increase from a low production speed line
were underestimated and following an increase of a high production speed line overestimated. The objective formula for
computing savings includes differences between inverse speeds and this is intuitively very problematic for most people.
The purpose of the present studies was to explore ways of ameliorating or eliminating the bias. Study 1 was a control study
asking participants to increase the production speed of one production line to save the same amount of production resources
(man-months) as was saved by a speed increase in a reference line. The increases judged to match the reference alternatives
showed the same bias as in the earlier research on choices. In Study 2 the same task and problems were used as in Study 1,
but the participants were asked first to judge the resource saving of the reference alternative in a pair of alternatives before
they proceeded to the matching task. This weakened the average bias only slightly. In Study 3, the participants were asked
to judge the resources saved from each of two successive increases of the same single production line (other than those of
the matching task) before they continued to the matching problems. In this way a participant could realize that a second
production speed increase from a higher speed (e.g., from 40 to 60 items /man-month) gives less resource savings than the
same speed increase from a first lower speed (e.g., from 20 to 40 items/man-month. Following this, the judgments of the
same problems as in the other studies improved and the bias decreased significantly but it did not disappear. To be able to
make optimal decisions about productivity increases, people need information about the bias and/or reformulations of the
problems.
Keywords: resource savings, time-saving bias, efficiency, heuristics, debiasing.
1 Introduction
Assume that you are a manager who runs a company with
two production lines, A and B each of which should pro-
duce 1200 units of a product. Line A produces 30 and line
B 70 units per man-hour. To save man-hours and money
you have an opportunity to invest in one of these lines.
The increase in production speed you get for the same in-
vestment is for line A from 30 to 40, and for B from 70 to
110 units produced per man-hour. Where would you allo-
cate your investment? In an earlier study Svenson (2011)
had participants solve such problems with an instruction
including the following:
We want you to give spontaneous judgments
concerning which of two productivity improve-
ments will give most time-saving, line A or line
B. The two lines produce the same quantities of
the same product but at different lines. Your
task is to choose the alternative, which after a
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productivity improvement will give most time-
saving in man-hours compared to the situation
before the production improvement.
Line A Line B
Original productivity
30 units/man-hour
Original productivity
70 units/man-hour
Increased productivity
40 units/man-hour
Increased productivity
110 units/man-hour
Line A Line B Equal
(circle appropriate alternative)
Most people intuitively think that line B saves most
man-hours. Not only the differences between the speed
increases (10 units/man-hour faster for A and 40 for B)
speaks for B but also the ratios (40/30 and 110/70) fa-
vor B. In fact, A saves more man-hours than B. We use
this example to illustrate a correct algebraic solution of
the problem. Assume that 1200 units are produced. Then,
it takes line A 1200/30 (=40) man-hours to produce that
quantity and 1200/40 (= 30) man-hours after the efficiency
increase. Line B started with 1200/70 (=17.14) man-hours
and after the improvement 1200/110 (=10.91) man-hours.
Thus, the saving was 10 man-hours for line A and 6.23
man-hours for line B.
In general, unaided judgments of time and resources
saved by increasing speed are prone to the time-saving
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bias (Svenson, 1970, 2008, 2011), which is illustrated by
this example. The bias means that, when speed is in-
creased from a low speed, judgments of savings are under-
estimated and when speed is increased from a high speed,
they are overestimated.
Brown and Gobeli defined productivity as “measured as
a ratio of the unit’s outputs to inputs for a given period of
time” (Brown & Gobeli, 1992, p. 325) and, even, if there
are many formal measurement systems, unaided intuitive
first impression judgments of productivity and productiv-
ity changes are important for preliminary and later final
decisions (Svenson, 2003). In the present contribution, we
study judgments of resource savings after an increase in
efficiency or productivity as a prototype for judgments of
time/resource savings in general and how they can be de-
biased. Such judgments have been found to be systemat-
ically biased in other areas (Eriksson et al., 2013; Fuller
et al., 2009; Larrick & Soll, 2008; Peer & Gamliel, 2012;
Svenson, 1970, 2008) and the purpose of the present con-
tribution is to validate the results from earlier production
choice experiments (Svenson, 2011) in studies of judg-
ments and to find ways of avoiding the time-saving bias.
The objective mathematical function relating increase
of production speed to resources saved (Svenson, 2011) is
the same also in other areas, such as, time saved by driving
faster and fuel saved by using a more fuel efficient car
(more miles per gallon) (Larrick & Soll, 2008; Svenson,
1970, 2008). Therefore, we assumed that human judges
will be prone to make the same kind of judgment biases
in all of these contexts and that a learning technique that
is successful in debiasing judgments in one context will
prove efficient also in other contexts.
The early study of the time-saving bias and how it could
be avoided, Svenson (1971) used direct quick feedback
of correct answers without explanation or time for insight
or explicit reasoning. His participants were given train-
ing sessions of 2.5 hours per day during a week. The
problems in a training session consisted of 1.5 hours of
training with feedback in terms of a correct solution to
each of a series of time-saving problems. Tests of learn-
ing were conducted before and after each learning ses-
sion giving a total of 10 test phases. This way of learn-
ing to avoid the bias was extremely slow. It could be
seen as based on exemplar learning (problem-response
associations) coupled with quick non-conscious implicit
similarity judgments giving the responses. In the present
contribution, this “similar to exemplars strategy” will be
classified as System 1 learning and it will be contrasted
with System 2 learning that uses conscious mental pro-
cesses. This simple two system approach classification
of the processes leading to a judgment has been used by
several researchers in the past (Epstein, 1994, Chaiken &
Trope, 1999). Experiential System 1 processes are seen as
holistic, associationistic, fast and sometimes affective and
the system is not open to conscious awareness (Epstein,
1994), while operations in System 2 use logical connec-
tions and conscious reasons to reach a judgment (Slovic,
Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002; Kahneman, 2003).
Even though the System 1 and System 2 dichotomy is im-
precise and applies only approximately in the present con-
text, we will refer to it when we contrast different ways of
debiasing time/resource-saving judgments.1 Because the
earlier study by Svenson (1971) with an exemplar-based
System 1 approach was not so successful, we selected an
approach to learning that requires less learning time and
invites deliberate conscious controlled reasoning and in-
creased insights into how comparisons of resource saving
options can be made without systematic biases. Studies of
such processes motivate the use of verbal protocols, that
can reflect conscious System 2 processes and complement
regular analyses of choices or numerical responses.
When a judge encounters a numerical judgment prob-
lem, there seems to be a hierarchy of rules in at least
partly controlled cognition with a linear rule attempted
first, as emphasized in an early paper by Brehmer, Ha-
gafors and Johansson (1980) and later reported by several
other authors (e.g., Dutt, & Gonzalez, 2013). If the linear
rule is found unsatisfactory, curvilinear rules are attempted
with more or less success (Ebersbach Lehner, Resing
& Wilkening, 2008; Brehmer 1971, Wagenaar, 1975,
Cronin et al., 2009). If there is more than one informa-
tion variable, additive relationships are implemented first
( Brehmer 1971) and, if found unsuccessful, judgments
of ratios and proportions may be attempted (Resnick &
Singer, 1993). In the present study we focused on the use
of linear and proportional rules that were used in solutions
of resource saving problems.
The earlier study by Svenson (2011) showed that the
time/resource saving bias distorted choices between pro-
ductivity increase options in line with the time-saving bias
(Svenson, 1970, 2008). In the present contribution, we
assumed that this choice bias would also appear in judg-
ments of resource savings, that it is reflected in verbal re-
ports (System 2) and numerical answers (both System 1
and System 2) and that it could be counteracted in learning
sessions inviting System 2 learning processes. Because
the resource saving bias found for choices was replicated
1The dichotomy has been criticized (Keren & Schul, 2009; Kruglan-
ski & Gigerenzer, 2011) on different grounds, e.g., the difficulty of find-
ing criteria for a clear separation of the two systems. According to Evans
(2008, p. 255), a number of authors have suggested that there may be two
architecturally (and evolutionarily) distinct cognitive systems underlying
dual-process models. “However, it emerges that (a) there are multiple
kinds of implicit processes described by different theorists and (b) not all
of the proposed attributes of the two kinds of processing can be sensibly
mapped on to two systems as currently conceived. It is suggested that
while some dual-process theories are concerned with parallel competing
processes involving explicit and implicit knowledge systems, others are
concerned with the influence of preconscious processes that contextual-
ize and shape deliberative reasoning and decision-making.”
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in the matching judgment task of the first study, we con-
tinued with two more studies with new participants drawn
from the same population as the first set of participants.
In these two additional studies, we investigated how the
bias could be neutralized or eliminated by two different
instructions and reformulations of the problems.
1.1 Model
In general terms, the man-hour gain, G from an improve-
ment of a production line A or B is
U
P1
−
U
P2
= G, (1)
where U is the number of units to be produced, P1 and
P2 are the production speeds in units/man-hour before and
after an improvement for a production line. Here, partic-
ipants are asked to match two different productivity in-
creases, for production lines A and B, so that they save
equal amounts of resources, by choosing the increased
speed of B that is needed to achieve this end. Here, PA1
is the initial production speed of A and PA2 the increased
speed of A, and likewise for PB1 and PB2, which is in
bold font to indicate that it is to be judged by the partici-
pant.
Based on earlier research (Svenson, 2008), participants
are assumed to follow the heuristic described by Equation
(2),
PA2 − PA1
PA2
=
PB2 − PB1
PB2
. (2)
This means that when the ratio between the speed increase
and the higher speed is the same for two alternatives they
are judged to save equal amounts of resources. Equation
(2) can be reformulated as 1−PA1/PA2 = 1−PB1/PB2,
or PB1/PB2 = PA1/PA2, and we call this the ratio rule.
The correct equation is.
PA2 − PA1
PA1PA2
=
PB2 − PB1
PB1PB2
(3)
Note, that the difference between Equations (2) and (3)
lies in the fact that people are unable to adjust for both
PA1 and PB1 in the denominators. The mathematics lead-
ing from Equation (1) to equation (3) can be found in the
appendix.
Peer and Gamliel (2013) found, in their studies, that
the denominators in Equation (2), in another context, were
PA1 and PB1 instead of PA2 and PB2. We do not know
yet when the initial or increased speed is used in the de-
nominator or what characteristics of people or problems
that favor the use of one or the other factor. However, in
the present study with matching tasks it does not matter
which speed is used in the denominator of Equation (2).
We hypothesized that, in the context of productivity in-
crease judgments, participants would also use Equation (2)
when asked to make two productivity increase gains equal.
We used units/man-month instead of units/man-hour in
the present studies as the productivity measure because it
fits our judgment problems better than man-hour and the
above equations apply to any production speed measure.
In the first study, we tested the hypothesis predict-
ing that the time-saving bias should be replicated in the
resource saving judgments following a productivity in-
crease. We also wanted to identify specific judgment rules
that participants used. In the second study, we tested
the hypothesis that explicit intuitive judgments of man-
months saved in a comparison alternative should improve
matching judgments of resource savings and decrease the
resource saving bias. In the third study, we asked partici-
pants to give two resource saving judgments concerning a
single production line, improved in two successive steps.
We tested the hypothesis that such judgments improve the
participants’ judgments and decrease the resource saving
bias.
2 General method
2.1 Participants
The participants were recruited from the same population
of university students, psychology students at Stockholm
university, for each of the three studies. In Study 1, 29
participants took part in the experiment (mean age 25.0)
of whom 21 were female. Study 2, included 31 partici-
pants (mean age 25.6 years) of whom 24 were female and
in Study 3 there were 31 participants (mean age 27.1) of
whom 21 were female.2 The participants received either
a movie ticket voucher or a psychology course credit for
their participation. No participant was in more than one
study.
2The time-saving bias was investigated earlier in driving contexts and
was found to be quite strong. To illustrate, Svenson (2009, Table 2) in-
vestigated matching a speed increase from 60 to 110 km/h with a speed
increase from 30 km/h, which gave an average judgment of 66 km/h
(SD=30.6). The correct speed is 40 km/h which gives an effect size of
0.85 SD. This means that for p = 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 a minimum of 17,
24 and 32 participants would be needed to detect the phenomenon with
a power of 0.90 at these significance levels. In Study 1 we investigated
29 participants and found significance for all problems (9 problems with
p<0.001 and 1 problem with p<0.01). However, in the present investiga-
tion we were interested not only in detecting the phenomenon but also in
detecting differences in the strength of the phenomenon in Studies 2 and
3. We used the average absolute proportional difference between judg-
ments and correct values and the standard deviations for all problems as
shown in Table 1. The average absolute proportional difference was 0.51
and we decided that we wanted to detect at least an improvement down to
0.35 deviation from the correct value (0.00 assuming no random error).
With 29 participants in Study 1 the power to detect this change between
Study 1 and Study 2 and 3 would be 0.874 with 30 participants in each
of the other studies assuming constant standard deviations and alpha =
0.05.
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2.2 Procedure
The participants completed the questionnaires with the
problems in a classroom and were informed that they
could take the time they wanted to make their intuitive
judgments and solve the problems. The participants used
about 15 to 25 minutes to complete the judgments in each
study. External decision aids like pens and calculators
were not allowed in any of the studies. The order of the
problems was counter balanced between participants in
each study. The problems, materials and results will be
presented separately below for each of the studies.
3 Study 1: Matching two resource
improvement options
Based on earlier studies of choice behavior and the time-
saving bias (Svenson, 2008, 2010), we predicted that
matching judgments should be greater than objectively re-
quired when a lower speed was increased to match an in-
crease of a greater speed. When a higher speed was in-
creased to match a change in lower speeds we predicted
that the judgments would be too small according to the
time-saving bias.
3.1 Material and problems
The questionnaire consisted of 10 problems. Each prob-
lem consisted of two production lines, each of which pro-
duced 1000 units of a product. The first production line
(Line A) had undergone an improvement that saved a cer-
tain amount of man-months. For this line, the participant
was given the production speed before and after improve-
ment. For the second production line (Line B), the partic-
ipant was given only the production speed before the im-
provement, and an empty space for the participant’s judg-
ment. The participant’s task was to judge the increased
production rate for line B, which after the improvement
would save the same amount of man-months as for Line
A when 1000 units were produced (number of units are
not important as long as they are not too few as shown in
appendix). The following is an example from the ques-
tionnaire.
Line A: before improvement 40 units/man-
month, after improvement 60 units/man-month,
Line B: before improvement 80 units/man-
month, after improvement _______units/man-
months.
The participants wrote their judgments in the blank
space. At the end of the instruction the participant was
informed that the number of units that were produced has
no effect on the solutions of the problems. On the last
page of the questionnaire, the participants were asked to
describe their thoughts while making their judgments.
Table 1 shows the problems and that there were 6 prob-
lems (cases, 2,4,6,7,8,9) in which the matching speed was
to be increased from a lower speed and 4 problems (cases
1,3,5,10) in which the increase was from a higher speed.
As stated above, the time-saving bias predicts that the for-
mer cases should give overestimations of correct produc-
tion speed and the latter underestimations of the speeds
needed to match the comparison increase.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Qualitative measures
No participant was excluded because of judgment out-
liers or other deviant judgments. The descriptions of how
the participants solved the problems were transcribed and
then coded independently by two coders. After an initial
screening of the solution strategies, the verbal protocols
were coded in one and only one of the following cate-
gories, (1) ratio rule, (2) difference rule or (3) other rule.
The ratio rule was described by Equation (2) and the dif-
ference rule by the following equation with the judged in-
creased matching speed in bold.
PB2 − PB1 = PA2 − PA1 (4)
The inter coder agreement between the two coders was
23/29 (79.31%) for the participants’ descriptions of how
they solved the problems with Kappa = .681, p<.001. The
final codings were determined jointly by the two coders
and they found that 12 participants reported a ratio rule
as their main rule, while 10 of the remaining participants
stated that they used a difference rule. The remaining 7
participants did not indicate any of these rules and were
classified in the “other rule” category.
3.2.2 Quantitative measures
First, the mean values of the judgments for each problem
were compared with the objectively correct values with
two-tailed one-sample t-tests. The mean judgments were
significantly different from the objectively correct speeds
for all problems (Table 1). As predicted, when the ini-
tial production speed was lower for line A than for line
B, the judged matching increase of B’s production speed
was too low. When the initial production speed was higher
for line A than for line B, the judged matching production
speed was too high. The results show underestimations of
the effects on savings in man-months of increasing pro-
duction rates from 40 units/man-month or less. When the
initial productivity was 70 units/man-month or higher, the
effects of increases on man-month gains were overesti-
mated. This corroborated earlier findings of time-saving
studies (Svenson, 2008).
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Table 1: Average judged production speeds, difference rule predictions, ratio rule predictions, correct solutions and
proportional deviations from correct solutions in Study 1 and Study 2. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Predictions
Average/Median
(Judgment - Correct)/
Correct
Production Study 1 Study 2 Difference Ratio Correct Study 1 Study 2
speeds N Average N Average
Case 1
(A:40/60,
B:80/x)
28 107.32***
(11.59)
31 111.29***
(71.90)
100.00 120.00 240.00 −0.55/-0.58
(0.05)
−0.54/-0.54
(0.30)
Case 2
(A:70/110,
B:30/x)
28 57.96***
(11.27)
31 52.58***
(22.68)
70 47.14 35.54 0.63/0.55
(0.32)
0.48/0.32
(0.64)
Case 3
(A:40/50,
B:80/x)
28 94.39***
(6.81)
31 86.71***
(42.12)
90 100.00 133.33 −0.29/-0.33
(0.05)
−0.35/-0.25
(0.32)
Case 4
(A:80/90,
B:40/x)
28 48.64**
(8.54)
30 55.93n.s.
(38.83)
50 45.00 42.35 0.15/0.07
(0.20)
0.32/0.12
(0.92)
Case 5
(A:30/40,
B:70/x)
29 86.17***
(9.45)
31 86.14***
(52.59)
80 93.33 168,00 −0.49/-0.49
(0.06)
−0.49/-0.46
(0.31)
Case 6
(A:70/130,
B:30/x)
29 69.34***
(23.46)
30 50.33*
(25.52)
90 55.71 37.40 0.85/0.52
(0.63)
0.35/0.27
(0.68)
Case 7
(A:80/120,
B40/x)
29 68.69***
(11.09)
31 66.29**
(33.67)
80 60.00 48.00 0.43/0.25
(0.23)
0.38/0.25
(0.70)
Case 8
(A:80/100,
B:40/x)
28 56.14***
(13.41)
30 52.33*
(17.35)
60 50 44.44 0.26/0.13
(0.30)
0.18/0.13
(0.39)
Case 9
(A:80/150,
B:40/x)
29 86.21***
(16.75)
30 77.45*
(61.49)
110 75.00 52.17 0.65/0.44
(0.32)
0.48/0.25
(1.18)
Case 10
(A:40/70,
B:80/x)
28 121.50***
(21.70)
30 257.00***
(307.28)
110 140.00 560.00 −0.78/-0.77
(0.04)
−0.54/-0.77
(0.55)
Note: * = p<.05 , ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001, one sample t-test for difference between judgment averages and objectively
correct answers. Standard deviations in parentheses. Bold digits indicate significant improvements from Study 1 to
Study 2, two-tailed t-tests independent samples, p<0.01 (case 6) and p<0.05 (case 10).
The next to the last column in Table 1 shows the average
and median proportional deviations from the correct value
for each case in Study 1, (judgment - correct value) /cor-
rect value. On average the deviations were about +50%
when Line B started at a lower speed and about −50%
when Line B started at a higher speed. We used regres-
sion analysis to find out how well the difference and ratio
rules could predict the judgments. The resource saving
values predicted from the difference and ratio rules were
the two independent variables for each case and the aver-
age judgment across participants was the dependent vari-
able, J. The fitted function was J = 0.38·diff + 0.54·ratio
+ 7.89 (F(2,7) = 5699.5, p<0.001). This shows that both
rules were reasonable predictors of the judgments on the
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average group level and that the ratio rule seemed to give
the overall better predictions.
3.2.3 Quantitative and qualitative analysis
We have verbal reports about the rule used by different
participants. If these reports are valid, it should be pos-
sible to validate the verbal reports in numerical analyses
of the judgments (Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al., 2011). As-
suming that the 12 participants who reported that they used
the ratio rule also did so, this means that if this subgroup is
analyzed separately the ratio rule should predict their judg-
ments to a greater extent than when all participants were
analyzed. The corresponding holds for the 10 participants
who reported using the difference rule.
First, we analyzed the data from the 12 participants in
the ratio group. We computed the average for each case
and used regression analysis and partial correlations in the
same way as for the averages across all participants in the
previous section. The regression function J =−0.04·diff +
0.99·ratio + 3.81 (F=(2,7) = 7493.0, p<0.001). This analy-
sis was repeated with the 10 participants in the difference
group. The resulting regression function was J = 0.83·diff
+ 0.10·ratio + 4.59 (F(2,7)= 798.1, p < 0.001). These re-
sults verified the validity of the verbal reports.
We wanted to go deeper into the analysis on the individ-
ual level and computed partial correlations between judg-
ments and the ratio rule predictions with the difference
variable controlled for each participant. Correspondingly,
we computed partial correlations between judgments and
the difference variable with the ratio variable controlled.
The results with the classifications of the verbal reports
are shown in Table A in the Appendix. Of the 12 partic-
ipants who reported the ratio rule all 12 gave judgments
that were explained by that rule (p=0.01) and 2 more par-
ticipants’ judgments clearly showed that they also used the
ratio rule without having reported this. The judgments in-
dicated significant use of the difference rule for 7 (p=0.01)
of the 10 participants who reported that they used the dif-
ference rule. The partial correlations with at least a 0.01
significance were used to group the participants into a
ratio and a difference group. The average absolute dif-
ference, |judgment−correct value| in the ratio group was
73.96 (3.35) and in the difference group 85.82 (19.94).
This group difference was significant (t = 2.21, p<0.05,
two-tailed), illustrating that the ratio rule gives judgments
that are closer to correct than the difference rule.
In conclusion, the resource-saving bias is a kind of
time-saving biases found in earlier studies (Svenson, 2008,
2011) and it was replicated in the present studies as a
matching bias. The systematic matching bias could be
derived from at least two different cognitively controlled
judgment rules, the difference rule and the ratio rule (we
may assume largely System 2 processes) each of which
was favored by one subgroup of participants. Both rules
give biased estimates of resource savings.
In the following studies, we tested two ways of coun-
teracting or eliminating the time or resource-saving bias
in productivity increase judgments. Because most partici-
pants in Study 1 seemed to use controlled System 2 strate-
gies, we used debiasing techniques based on reframing of
problems enabling a participant her- or himself to gain in-
sight into her or his own biases, enabling a change of rule
for improvement.
One reason for the bias may be that people do not ac-
knowledge how much resources are saved by the already
known productivity increase in line A before they proceed
to a comparison and this will be focused in the next study.
The participants in this study were all recruited from the
same pool of students at Stockholm University as in Study
1 and none had participated in Study 1.
4 Study 2: Matching preceded by
judgments of resource savings
In this study, we encouraged the participants to estimate
the man-months saved from the already implemented im-
provement of the first line A, before they judged the speed
increase needed in B to match the resource saving of A.
4.1 Material and problems
We used the same 10 problems as in Study. Again, 1000
units were produced by each production line. The produc-
tion speeds before and after an improvement were given
for A and the participants judged the increased speed of B
that would match the resource saving of A.
In this attempt to improve judgment performance, we
asked the participants to estimate the man-months saved
from the already known improvement of A before they
judged the speed of the second line. Thus, the instruc-
tion to the participants was quite similar to the instruction
given in Study 1 but, it also included the following infor-
mation.
Your task is twofold: (1) First, estimate how
many man-months line A will save from the im-
provement (from the low production speed to
the highest speed). (2) Estimate in units/man-
month the increased production speed of line
B that would save the same amount of man-
months as the improvement of line A.
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Line A Line B
Before improvement
production:
Before improvement
production:
30 units/man-month 40 units/man-month
After improvement
production:
After improvement
production:
40 units/man-month
The A improvement
saves ___ man months
when 1000 units are
produced
line B ___
units/man-month
The instruction explained the problems and the concept
of man-month before the problem set was presented to the
participants. When solving a problem a participant was
not allowed to use external aids and told that the experi-
menter wanted her or his own unaided judgments.
4.2 Results
We excluded three participants who did not solve 90% or
more of the problems, leaving judgments from 31 partici-
pants for analysis. Three outliers further than 4 SD from
the mean judgment of a problem were treated as missing
data. Table 1 shows that the average judgments deviated
from correct values in the same directions as in Study
1, but the average judgment was not significantly differ-
ent from the correct value for problem 4. We compared
each problem in Study 1 and Study 2 and found that 2
judgments averages of the 10 problems improved signifi-
cantly (two tailed t-tests, p=0.05). Hence, making a par-
ticipant aware of the normatively logical first step of com-
puting the saving for an existing alternative before giving a
matching judgment for its alternative improved what may
be called System 2 performance somewhat.
As in Study 1, we computed partial correlations for each
participant between her or his judgments and the ratio and
difference rule predictions and the average absolute devia-
tion of the judgments from the correct values. The results
(Appendix Table B) showed a decreased frequency of the
difference rule. The ratio rule was significant at the 0.01
level for 12 of the 31 participants.
The resource-saving bias indicates that people do not
understand the importance of the production speed from
which an increase takes place. The purpose of Study 3 was
to attempt to further improve intuitive judgments by hav-
ing participants judge resource savings of the same pro-
duction line after each of two steps of production speed
increase (from P1 to P2 and from P2 to P3). In such
problems, there are two production speed increases start-
ing from two different speeds, just as in the matching task,
but with one production line instead of two different lines.
With this re-framing of the problem, a judge may become
aware of the different effects of increases from a low and
a high production speed.
5 Study 3: Matching session pre-
ceded by a preparatory session of
successive resource saving judg-
ments
Study 3 was designed to have participants themselves im-
prove their judgment strategies in a way different from
Study 2. We gave participants an initial set of problems in
which it becomes obvious to a problem solver that neither
the difference nor the ratio rule give reasonable solutions.
The problems concerned two successive improvements of
production speeds at the same plant and illustrate that the
ratio rule gives solutions that are wrong. The difference
rule is less complex than the ratio rule because the ratio
rule includes the difference in the numerator. The differ-
ence rule gives poorer judgments than the ratio rule, and
we designed the learning problems so that they should also
illustrate that the difference rule is incorrect. We presented
a separate and different set of resource saving problems in
a separate session before the participants matched the 10
resource saving problems used in Studies 1 and 2.
Specifically, we predicted that, if the participants made
judgments of only one production line with two successive
production speed increases, they should become aware of
the fact that the same proportional speed or difference im-
provement from a lower original production speed saves
more resources than the same proportional or difference
improvement from higher speeds. This is an important
insight if one wants to counteract the production or time-
saving bias. In this way, both the difference and ratio rules
can be challenged by the participants themselves when
they judge successive improvements. To exemplify, if an
industry increases production speed from 20 units/man-
hour to 40 units/man-hour it would save 50% of the re-
sources. If the industry then increases production speed
further to 80 units/man-hour, it would save 50% of the re-
sources from the production efficiency already attained af-
ter the prior increase (and this is much less than the saving
followed by the first speed increase). Hence, the two 50%
speed increases do not give the same resource savings as
predicted by the ratio rule.
5.1 Material and problems
The first set of problems presented a production line for
1000 units that had just been improved from one produc-
tion rate (e.g., 30 units/man-month) to another (e.g., 40
units/man-month). The participants were asked to judge
the resources saved in terms of worker man-months from
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 9, No. 5, September 2014 Modeling and debiasing resource saving judgments 472
this already implemented efficiency improvement. Af-
ter having made a judgment of the man-months saved by
the already implemented speed increase to 40 units/man-
month, the participant was informed that the present speed
was insufficient and that a second efficiency improvement
was planned for the same line to reach an even higher
production speed (e.g., 60 units/man-month). How many
man-months would this plan save compared to the cur-
rent production speed? The problems included the follow-
ing speed triplets with speeds used in the previous stud-
ies: 40,60,80; 30,70,110; 40,50,80; 40,80,90; 30,40,70;
30,70,130; 40,80,120; 40,80,100; 40,80,150: 40,70,80.
The participants were recruited in the same way as in the
earlier studies and no participant had taken part in the pre-
vious studies. The participants judged the saving of one
problem and turned to the next problem. After having
completed this learning task, the participants solved the
same problems as in Study 2.
5.2 Results
All participants solved more than 90% of the problems.
None was excluded. Five outliers further than 4 SD from
the mean judgment of a problem were eliminated from the
data. The average judgments in Table 2 illustrate the time-
saving bias with all averages differing from the correct val-
ues in the direction predicted by the time-saving bias. We
performed two tailed t-tests (p=0.001) to compare Study 1
and Study 3 case by case. The results showed that the av-
erage judgments in Study 3 were significantly better than
the averages in Study 1 (bold digits in Table 2) except for
Case 4. The proportional deviations from correct values
illustrate that the participants made improvements com-
pared to the performance in the other studies.
The time-saving bias predicts overestimation of produc-
tion resources saved from low production speeds and un-
derestimations from high speeds. Therefore, we split the
problems in two sets of problems, increases from low and
high speeds respectively and illustrated the data separately
in these sets. Figure 1 gives the median proportional devi-
ations for increases from low speeds in the top bars show-
ing that the underestimation of the effect of a speed in-
creases from a low speed and that the time-saving bias
approaches zero and decreases over studies. Correspond-
ingly, the effects of speed increases from high speeds are
overestimated, judged speed changes will be too small as
shown by the lower bars in Figure 1. However, the time-
saving bias was not completely eliminated.
As in Study 1 we computed partial correlations for each
participant. The results (Table B in appendix) showed a
decreased frequency of the difference rule in comparison
with Study 1 and only 2 partial correlations of 31 correla-
tions were significant (p<0.01). The ratio rule was signif-
icant (p=0.01) for 17 of the 31 participants. However, the
Figure 1: Median proportional deviations from correct an-
swers in Study 1, 2 and 3. The upper bars describe me-
dian proportional deviations for the problems where the
slower reference speed of the reference alternative A was
greater than the slower speed of B (to be matched). Cor-
respondingly, the lower bars describe median proportional
deviations of problems with the lower reference speed in
A slower than the lower speed of B.
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ratio rule and the correct rule are highly correlated (for this
set of cases r=0.89, p=0.001) and therefore we compared
the absolute deviations from correct values as well and
they were significantly smaller than those of Study 2. A
one-way ANOVA of the mean average absolute deviations
from correct values for the 3 studies (means 80.4, 79.3
and 53.9 for Study 1, 2 and 3) were significantly different,
F(2:86) = 7.97, p<0.001. Post hoc Scheffe t-tests showed
significance between Study 3 and Study 2 (p<0.01) and
between Study 1 and Study 3 (p<0.01) and no significance
between the first two studies.
6 Discussion
The studies illustrated that the time/resource-saving bias
found in choices between efficiency improvements with
the purpose of maximizing resource savings also applies
to judgments. In search of the mental processes behind
the resource saving bias, we found that verbal protocols
identified two System 2 rules, the difference and the ra-
tio rule, both of which give biased judgments of resource
savings. Analyses of verbal protocols should be supported
by analyses of other kinds of data (Ranyard & Svenson,
2011) and therefore, the verbal protocol results were vali-
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Table 2: Average judged production speeds, difference rule predictions, ratio rule predictions, correct solutions and
average and median proportional deviations from correct solutions in Study 1 and Study 3.
Predictions
Average/Median
(Judgment - Correct)/
Correct
Production Study 1 Study 3 Difference Ratio Correct Study 1 Study 3
speeds N Average N Average
Case 1
(A:40/60,
B:80/x)
28 107.32***
(11.59)
30 172.33***
(77.46)
100.00 120.00 240.00 −0.55/-0.58
(0.05)
−0.28/-0.33
(0.32)
Case 2
(A:70/110,
B:30/x)
28 57.96***
(11.27)
31 43.37**
(15.6)
70 47.14 35.54 0.63/0.55
(0.32)
0.22/0.13
(0.44)
Case 3
(A:40/50,
B:80/x)
28 94.39***
(6.81)
31 112.52***
(28.97)
90 100.00 133.33 −0.29/-0.33
(0.05)
−0.16/-0.10
(0.22)
Case 4
(A:80/90,
B:40/x)
28 48.64**
(8.54)
30 46.12*
(7.88)
50 45.00 42.35 0.15/0.07
(0.20)
0.09/0.03
(0.19)
Case 5
(A:30/40,
B:70/x)
29 86.17***
(9.45)
30 124.20***
(42.69)
80 93.33 168,00 −0.49/-0.49
(0.06)
−0.26/-0.23
(0.25)
Case 6
(A:70/130,
B:30/x)
29 69.34***
(23.46)
31 49.26**
(23.31)
90 55.71 37.40 0.85/0.52
(0.63)
0.32/0.07
(0.62)
Case 7
(A:80/120,
B40/x)
29 68.69***
(11.09)
30 55.38**
(15.13)
80 60.00 48.00 0.43/0.25
(0.23)
0.15/0.04
(0.32)
Case 8
(A:80/100,
B:40/x)
28 56.14***
(13.41)
29 49.10*
(10.94)
60 50 44.44 0.26/0.13
(0.30)
0.10/0.01
(0.25)
Case 9
(A:80/150,
B:40/x)
29 86.21***
(16.75)
30 64.87*
(28.69)
110 75.00 52.17 0.65/0.44
(0.32)
0.24/0.00
(0.55)
Case 10
(A:40/70,
B:80/x)
28 121.50***
(21.70)
31 367.74**
(299.93)
110 140.00 560.00 −0.78/-0.77
(0.04)
−0.34/-0.46
(0.54)
Note. * = p<.05 , ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001, two sample t-test differences from correct values. Standard deviations
in parentheses. Bold digits indicate significant improvements from Study 1 to Study 3, two-tailed t-tests independent
samples, p < 0.01 for all cases except p< 0.05 for case 8, and n.s. for case 4.
dated in regression and correlation analyses based on nu-
merical responses. The time/resource saving bias persisted
and decreased only slightly when participants were asked
to judge the resources saved for a reference alternative be-
fore solving a matching problem. But the bias could be
weakened significantly by having the participants make
judgments of the effects of successive production speed
increases of one single production site before comparing
alternatives in a matching session, although the systematic
error was not eliminated completely.
It is interesting to compare these approaches to that of
Peer and Gamliel (2013), who re-framed the problem and
instead of speed (mph) and gave information about how
long it would take to complete a given distance (min/mile).
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This kind of information was also used by Eriksson et al.
(2013) in a driving simulator study. Both studies show
that, even if mph or km/h are more natural ways of ex-
pressing speed than the inverses, the latter drastically de-
creases or eliminates the time saving bias.
When small groups of participants are compared, as
they are here, uncontrolled group differences can influence
the results. However, the time-saving bias is a very strong
effect, and the statistical power in these studies is high.
Also, the results were strong with participants randomly
assigned to Study 2 or 3 and tested simultaneously. All of
this makes between-studies uncontrolled effects unlikely.
We used two measures of judgmental accuracy in the
studies, average absolute deviation from correct values
(Appendix Tables A, B and C) and proportional differ-
ences (Tables 1 and 2, Figure 1). From an applied per-
spective, a saved man-month is the always the same and
therefore average absolute deviation from correct value is
a proper measure. From a psychological perspective, we
know since the days of Fechner that judgmental precision
is related to magnitude, so we also used the proportional
difference from correct value as a measure. These mea-
sures gave slightly different views on the judgments for
Study 2. Proportional differences suggested that perfor-
mance was slightly better than did the absolute difference
measure.
In conclusion, part of the bias depends on the applica-
tion of inadequate judgment rules, such as the difference
and ratio rules. Interestingly, the participants themselves
could improve their strategies and judgments after having
solved only a small number of related problems. This re-
sult supports the suggestion from Study 1 that the produc-
tion speed saving bias is more of a System 2 than a System
1 phenomenon, in contrasts to other heuristics like the rep-
resentativeness and affect heuristics, which are seen as pri-
marily in System 1 (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Slovic,
Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007).
From an applied perspective, productivity and increase
of productivity of any activity is of general and increas-
ing social concern. Even if there are many formal systems
to measure productivity (Brown & Gobeli, 1992), unaided
calculations of the effects of productivity changes are im-
portant for final decisions (Svenson, 2003). Reformula-
tions of the problems can improve those calculations to the
benefit of those of us who are not experts in indicators of
productivity. In this context it may be worth pointing out
that stopping of a less productive system and investment
of all resources in a more productive system is not always
the best decision strategy if one wants to maximize sav-
ings of available resources. When a problem involves the
effects of increases in speed, decision makers should be
warned about the time /resource saving bias and informed
about possibilities to reformulate a problem before they
make their decisions.
References
Brehmer, B. (1971). Subjects’ ability to use functional
rules. Psychonomic Science, 24(6), 259–260.
Brehmer, B., Hagafors, R., & Johansson, R. (1980). Cog-
nitive skills in judgment: Subjects’ ability to use infor-
mation about weights, function forms, and organizing
principles. Organizational Behavior and Human Per-
formance, 26(3), 373–385.
Brown, W. B. & Gobeli, D. (1992). Observations on the
measurement of R & D productivity: A case condition.
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 39,
325–331.
Chaiken, S., & Trope, Y. (Eds.). (1999). Dual-process
theories in social psychology. Guilford Press.
Cronin, M. A., Gonzalez, C., & Sterman, J. D. (2009).
Why don’t well-educated adultsunderstand accumula-
tion? A challenge to researchers, educators, and cit-
izens. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 108(1), 116–130.
Dutt, V., & Gonzalez, C. (2013). Reducing the linear per-
ception of nonlinearity: Use of a physical representa-
tion. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 26(1),
51–67.
Ebersbach, M., Lehner, M., Resing, W., & Wilkening, F.
(2008). Forecasting exponential growthand exponential
decline: Similarities and differences. Acta psycholog-
ica, 127(2), 247–257.
Eriksson, G., Svenson, O. & Eriksson, L. (2013). The
time-saving bias: Judgements, cognitionand perception.
Judgment and Decision Making, 8, 492–497.
Epstein, S. (1994). Integration of the cognitive and the
psychodynamic unconscious. American psychologist,
49(8), 709–724.
Evans, J. S. B. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of rea-
soning, judgment, and social cognition. Annual Review
of Psychology, 59, 255–278.
Fuller, R., Gormley, M., Stradling, S., Broughton, P., Kin-
near, N., O’Dolan, C., & Hannigan, B.(2009). Impact
of speed change on estimated journey time: Failure of
drivers to appreciate relevance of initial speed. Accident
Analysis & Prevention, 41(1), 10–14.
Kahneman, D. (2003). Maps of bounded rationality: Psy-
chology for behavioral economics. The American eco-
nomic review, 93(5), 1449–1475.
Keren, G., & Schul, Y. (2009). Two Is Not Always Better
Than One A Critical Evaluation of Two-System Theo-
ries. Perspectives on psychological science, 4(6), 533–
550.
Kruglanski, A. W., & Gigerenzer, G. (2011). Intuitive and
deliberate judgments are based on common principles.
Psychological review, 118(1), 97–109.
Larrick, R. P. & Soll, J. B.(2008). The MPG illusion. Sci-
ence, 320(5883), 1993–1594.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 9, No. 5, September 2014 Modeling and debiasing resource saving judgments 475
Peer, E., & Gamliel, E. (2012). Estimating time-savings:
The use of the proportion and percentage heuristics and
the role of need for cognition. Acta Psychologica, 141,
352–359.
Peer, E., & Gamliel, E. (2013). Pace yourself: Improving
time-saving judgments when increasing activity speed.
Judgment and Decision Making, 8(2), 106–115.
Ranyard, R., & Svenson, O. (2011). Verbal data and de-
cision process analysis. In M. Schulte-Mecklenbeck,
A. Kuehlberger, & R. Ranyard (Eds.) A Handbook of
process tracingmethods for decision research, (pp. 115–
137). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Resnick, L. B. & Singer, J. A. (1993). Protoquantitative
origins of ratio reasoning. In T. P. Carpenter, E. Fen-
nema & T. A. Romberg (Eds.) Rational numbers: An
integration of research. Studies in mathematical think-
ing and learning., (pp. 107–130). Hillsdale, NJ, Eng-
land: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Schulte-Mecklenbeck, M. Kuehlberger, A. & Ranyard, R.
(Eds.) (2011). A handbook of process tracing methods
for decision research. New York: Psychology Press.
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G.
(2002). Rational actors or rational fools: Implications
of the affect heuristic for behavioral economics. The
Journal of Socio-Economics, 31(4), 329–342.
Slovic, P., Finucane, M. L., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D.
G. (2007). The affect heuristic. European Journal of
Operational Research, 177(3), 1333–1352.
Svenson, O. (1970). A functional measurement approach
to intuitive estimation as exemplified by estimated time-
savings. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 86, 204–
210.
Svenson, O. (1971). Changing the structure of intuitive es-
timates of time-savings. Scandinavian Journal of Psy-
chology, 12, 131–134.
Svenson, O. (2003). Values, affect and processes in hu-
man decision making: a differentiation and consoli-
dation theory perspective. In S. L. Schneider & J.
Shanteau (Eds.) Emerging Perspectives on Judgment
and Decision research. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, (pp. 287–326).
Svenson, O. (2008). Decisions among time-saving op-
tions: When intuition is strong and wrong. Acta Psy-
chologica, 127, 501–509.
Svenson, O. (2011). Biased decisions concerning produc-
tivity increase options. Journal of Economic Psychol-
ogy, 32, 440–445.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under
uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185(4157),
1124–1131.
Wagenaar, W. A., (1975). Misperception of exponential
growth. Perception & Psychophysics, 18(6), 416–422.
Appendix
The man-hour gain, called G from an improvement of a
production line is
U
P1
−
U
P2
= G, (5)
where U is the number of units to be produced, P1 and P2
are the production speeds in units/man hour for before and
after the change.
Thus, when changes in production speeds are equal for
line A and line B, the following equality applies with PA1
as initial production speed of A and PA2 the increased
speed of A and PB1 as initial production speed of B and
PB2 the increased speed of B:
U
PA1
−
U
PA2
=
U
PB1
−
U
PB2
. (6)
Equation (6) applies only if U > 0 and U/PB1 >
U/PA1 − U/PA2 and U/PA1 > U/PB1 − U/PB2. The
latter conditions apply because if the man-hour gain in one
line is greater than the total man-hours needed to produce
the same number of units before improvement in the other
line, then there are not enough man-hours available to be
saved when matching the two alternatives. Division by U
gives
1
PA1
−
1
PA2
=
1
PB1
−
1
PB2
. (7)
Note that the total number of units produced is of no im-
portance to the choice between options as long as the con-
ditions specified above apply.
Assume that you want to calculate the increased pro-
ductivity, PB2, needed to give line B the same man-hour
gain as the production improvement of line A. The answer
can be derived from equation (7):
PB2 =
1
1
PB1
− ( 1
PA1
−
1
PA2
)
(8)
The formula seems complex for exact unaided judgments
but if the problems are presented as in the Svenson (2011)
problem scenario described earlier, they become easy to
apprehend and seemingly not difficult to judge. When
participants are asked to make two different productivity
increases equal by choosing the increased speed needed to
achieve this end, it is possible to rewrite Equation (8) in
the following way:
PA2 − PA1
PA1PA2
=
PB2 − PB1
PB1PB2
. (9)
In the studies of time-savings when driving, the partici-
pant’s judgments followed Equation (10) with production
speed corresponding to driving speed (Svenson, 2008).
Note, that the difference between equation (9) and (10)
lies in the fact that people were unable to adjust for both
PA1 and PB1 in the denominators.
PA2 − PA1
PA2
=
PB2 − PB1
PB2
. (10)
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Table A: Study 1: Codings of verbal protocols and partial correlations for ratio and difference rule predictions. When
the ratio rule applies so well that there is no variance left for the other rule no partial correlation can be computed.
This was indicated by - in the table. When a verbal protocol could not be coded this was also marked - and the last
column average absolute deviations from correct values. Last column shows average absolute deviations from correct
rule predictions.
Participant Verbal report
Correlation judgments and
ratio rule (difference rule
constant)
Correlation judgments and
difference rule (ratio rule
constant)
Average absolute deviation
from correct rule
1 − 0.91*** 0.25n.s. 80.54
2 ratio 0.95*** −0.21n.s. 70.14
3 difference − 1.00*** 92.14
4 difference − 1.00*** 92.14
5 ratio 0.98*** 0.38n.s. 73.14
6 difference 0.11n.s. 0.45n.s. 88.64
7 − 1.00*** −0.29n.s. 72.04
8 difference 0.52n.s. 0.94*** 90.14
9 ratio 0.91*** 0.08n.s. 76.04
10 difference − 1.00*** 92.14
11 ratio 1.00*** 0.14n.s. 72.64
12 difference 0.52n.s. 0.94** 98.43
13 ratio 1.00*** −0.36n.s. 72.04
14 − 0.37n.s. 0.99*** 86.27
15 − −0.21n.s. 0.07n.s. 108.14
16 difference − 1.00*** 92.14
17 difference 0.67* 0.65n.s. 88.14
18 − −0.37n.s. 0.94*** 92.61
19 − 0.93*** 0.10n.s. 78.54
20 difference 0.72* 0.45n.s. 85.14
21 ratio 1.00*** 0.14n.s. 72.64
22 ratio 0.97** −0.54n.s. − #
23 − 0.89** 0.10n.s. 78.14
24 ratio 0.90** −0.16n.s. 75.34
25 difference − 1.00*** 36.83
26 ratio 0.99*** −0.32n.s. 70.34
27 ratio 1.00*** −0.81** 71.14
28 ratio 0.99*** 0.24n.s. 72.94
29 ratio 1.00*** −0.10n.s. 71.84
The symbols ***, ** and * indicate 0.001, 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels and # incomplete data
set (judgments missing or outliers for 3 problems).
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Table B: Study 2: Partial correlations for predictions from ratio and difference rules. The last column gives average
absolute deviations from correct values.
Participant
Correlation judgments and ratio
rule (difference rule constant)
Correlation judgments and
difference rule (ratio rule constant)
Average absolute deviation
from correct rule
30 0.64n.s. −0.11n.s. 60.64
31 −0.59n.s. 0.65n.s. 135.60
32 0.12n.s. −0.61n.s. 138.35
33 0.80* −0.15n.s. 83.34
34 0.87*** 0.24n.s. 79.64
35 −0.58n.s. 0.78* 103.14
36 −0.82** 0.72* 118.74
37 0.68* −0.00n.s. 63.34
38 −0.66n.s. 0.78* 127.92
39 0.05n.s. −0.47n.s. 115.76
40 0.82** −0.42n.s. 64.58
41 0.79* −0.18n.s. 84.14
42 0.43n.s. 0.04n.s. 76.64
43 0.82** −0.24n.s. 10.66
44 0.99*** −0.09n.s. 71.94
45 −0.36n.s. 0.41n.s. 77.36
46 −0.48n.s. 0.45n.s. 126.51
47 0.43n.s. 0.79* 89.14
48 0.73* −0.17n.s. 27.58
49 0.84** −0.23n.s. 17.83
50 0.36n.s. 0.11n.s. 85.74
51 0.92*** −0.61n.s. 158.20
52 0.97*** −0.62n.s. 79.05
53 1.00*** 0.15n.s. 67.64
54 0.93*** −0.53n.s. 72.21
55 −0.22n.s. 0.54n.s. 39.15
56 0.81** −0.23n.s. 100.14
57 0.76* −0.14n.s. 12.43
58 0.63n.s. −0.52n.s. 22.92
59 0.80* −0.46n.s. 74.64
60 1.00*** −0.47n.s. 71.44
The symbols ***, ** and * indicate 0.001, 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels.
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Table C: Study 3: Partial correlations for predictions from ratio and difference rules. The last column gives average
absolute deviations from correct values.
Participant
Correlation judgments and ratio
rule (difference rule constant)
Correlation judgments and
difference rule (ratio rule constant)
Average absolute deviation
from correct rule
61 0.60n.s. 0.24n.s. 85.74
62 0.47n.s. −0.45n.s. 108.02
63 0.85* −0.58n.s. − #
64 0.70* −0.13n.s. 50.19
65 0.99*** −0.56n.s. 71.14
66 0.70* −0.17n.s. 26.78
67 0.88** −0.39n.s. 19.54
68 −0.26n.s. 0.70** 94.74
69 0.96*** −0.70** 77.02
70 0.90** −0.37n.s. 65.00
71 0.88** −0.30n.s. 14.50
72 0.88** −0.31n.s. 20.35
73 0.86** −0.35n.s. 8.97
74 0.95*** −0.13n.s. 76.14
75 0.94*** −0.48n.s. 26.48
76 0.71* −0.14n.s. 49.65
77 0.93*** −0.50n.s. 30.72
78 0.74* −0.15n.s. 59.72
79 0.82** −0.29n.s. 17.09
80 0.22n.s. 0.97*** 91.14
81 0.75* −0.16n.s. 55.44
82 0.91** −0.37n.s. 40.47
83 0.79* −0.22n.s. 12.70
84 0.87** −0.34n.s. 29.91
85 0.69* 0.23n.s. 81.84
86 0.92*** −0.60n.s. 52.58
87 0.92*** −0.48n.s. 59.41
88 0.94*** −0.60n.s. 41.24
89 0.87** −0.52n.s. 74.14
90 0.33n.s. 0.78* 85.14
91 − 1.00*** 92.14
The symbols ***, ** and * indicate 0.001, 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels and # incomplete data set (judgments
missing or outliers for 3 problems).
